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FACING A NUCLEAR ARMED ADVERSARY IN A REGIONAL
CONTINGENCY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JOINT COMMANDER

by

C. Robert Kehler

Colonel, USAF



A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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
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Abstract of

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CONTINGENCY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JOINT COMMANDER

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INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War changed the nuclear challenge facing the United States. While the massive Cold War nuclear threat has diminished, the predominant threat has become a small number of nuclear weapons in the hands of regional belligerents.¹ Although such adversaries could not directly threaten U.S. national survival, they could seriously threaten U.S. interests and allies, undermine regional stability, and greatly complicate U.S. military action if conflict erupts.

High priority initiatives are underway to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.² Nevertheless, several regional belligerents remain intent on acquiring nuclear capability.³ Recognizing the intensity with which some of these belligerents are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, the President has tasked the Department of Defense to be prepared to "deter, prevent, and defend against" the use of regional nuclear weapons if nonproliferation efforts fail.⁴

Unlike conventional conflicts which U.S. military commanders have directly experienced, and for which the armed forces have planned and trained extensively, operations against a regional adversary who either has or is presumed to have nuclear weapons would present operational-level problems that have never been directly experienced and are not yet fully understood.⁵ These problems can be grouped into three general areas:

- Nuclear weapons will complicate initial campaign planning.
- Nuclear weapons will affect course of action development and selection.
- Nuclear weapons will alter conventional war fighting doctrine and operations.

The destructive potential and extraordinary political nature of nuclear weapons makes them unique among weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Therefore, it is critical that the joint commander view a regional contingency involving nuclear weapons as far more than a standard planning problem. Joint and service war fighting doctrines and the joint operation planning process all provide important planning guidelines, yet those sources (some of which still carry a Cold War flavor) are general in nature and insufficient by themselves to ensure success. Only by contemplating, debating, and exercising regional nuclear contingencies will joint commanders fully appreciate the true nature of this threat.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING COMPLICATIONS

Nuclear weapons will complicate a regional planning and operating environment already filled with formidable joint and combined war fighting problems. Civil-military relations, coalition and alliance concerns, the information warfare environment, and the uncertain reaction of other regional nuclear powers are the foremost issues that the commander will confront as he begins the planning process.

Civil-Military Relations. Political considerations will drive the decision to use nuclear weapons and how they are employed.⁶ Because of this, civil-military relations are likely to be far different in this environment than the U.S. military has come to expect in recent years. Although U.S. commanders always expect civilian involvement and direction, the possibility of a regional nuclear exchange will cause far more direct political involvement in the details of the planning process than has been seen since the end of the Vietnam War (certainly far more than was seen in Desert Storm).⁷

Likewise, military calculations and assessments alone will not drive campaign decisions.⁸ The joint commander can expect far greater political input and participation in such decisions as operational objectives, target selection, restraints, rules of engagement, preemption, retaliation, collateral damage, and other lesser matters that are routinely left to the joint commander in a non-nuclear environment. Joint doctrine acknowledges this possibility and cautions that commanders "must fully appreciate the numerous and often complex factors that influence the U.S. nuclear planning process, and would likely shape U.S. decisions on the possible use of nuclear weapons."⁹

The extreme consequences of nuclear use will also cause the decision making process to slow considerably as the National Command Authorities (NCA) seek to retain tight political control of the conflict. Nuclear release procedures aside, some war fighting decisions that would normally be made by the joint commander in a conventional contingency are likely to be made at higher levels (e.g., campaign phases may be held until approval is granted by higher authority; restriking certain targets may not be allowed without permission, etc.). Joint commanders should also expect increased requests for information, progress reports, situation updates, and assessments. In the final analysis, the commander will have to adjust his own planning and decision making process to compensate.

Coalition and Alliance Concerns. Since one of the assumed objectives behind an adversary obtaining nuclear weapons is to prevent or fracture an opposing coalition, the joint commander must carefully consider the operational impact coalition difficulties will present. Potential coalition members and alliance partners alike will be affected by the possibility of nuclear use, and it is likely that United Nations' mandates will be far harder to obtain. The

U.S. may be forced to act unilaterally as some nations who view nuclear use as a greater danger than succumbing to regional aggression refuse to enter the conflict.

Each scenario will produce unique pressures on potential coalition members. The joint commander must be prepared for less overt commitment to forming a coalition, and for greater conditional commitment from those who join. The importance of the interests at stake, the specifics of the adversary's nuclear capabilities, and the strength of international feelings against that adversary are among the factors that will influence coalition efforts.¹⁰

Alliance partners are not immune from the influence of nuclear weapons. The joint commander need only recall Cold War debates to anticipate likely problems:

“...countless NATO policy debates were sparked by the threat of Soviet nuclear use in Western Europe and fueled by the perception that alliance members on the opposite sides of the Atlantic faced markedly different levels of nuclear risk. Similar concerns and dynamics might have come into play during the Gulf War if the United States and its allies had faced a nuclear-armed Iraq with missiles capable of striking neighboring states and Europe but not the continental United States.”¹¹

Coalition and alliance participation issues will have a practical as well as a symbolic affect on campaign planning and execution. For example, in an environment where U.S. power projection capability is a critical requirement, it may be far more difficult to obtain basing rights, overflight authorization, sealift support (some countries may not allow their merchant ships to transport military material to the theater), and logistical and financial support. Lack of troop commitments from some nations could further stress smaller U.S. forces.

The joint commander must fully consider the concerns of those who do ally themselves against the regional adversary.¹² To allay these concerns, the joint commander

may have to devote scarce operational resources to defending coalition and/or allied partners against nuclear attack (even when such resources are operationally required or better used elsewhere). Joint doctrine recognizes that it may be essential to establish an effective attack warning system that can “transcend communications interoperability and language barriers in real time.”¹³

Public Opinion, The Media, and Information Warfare. The possibility of nuclear weapon use will ignite intense political debate and cause extreme public concern in the democratic nations. Reflecting that debate and concern, the world press will subject both commander and forces to intense media scrutiny.

The regional nuclear scenario will certainly arouse the traditional anti-nuclear and anti-war groups who have been relatively quiet since the end of the Cold War. Many of these groups can marshal prominent public personalities that will virtually guarantee wide press coverage. Extremists will closely monitor and report on the movement of military forces (CONUS and in-theater) and will attempt to interfere with the movement of critical assets and supplies (particularly nuclear-capable forces). Strong anti-war sentiments will likely be aroused in many nations, with troops sensing divided support from “home.”

This international environment of extreme concern and divisive debate will prove fertile for astute adversaries to engage in information warfare. Given that the adversary would likely attempt to “use” his nuclear capability to deter or limit U.S./coalition involvement, the joint commander should expect the adversary to do everything possible to create the impression that intervention risks far outweigh prospective gains.¹⁴

Reaction of the Other WMD-Capable States. Although a regional nuclear contingency poses little threat of escalation to a global exchange, it is not clear how the declared and de facto nuclear states will react to U.S. intervention against a nuclear adversary. Even less clear is how the nations that possess chemical and biological weapons will react if nuclear weapons are employed in their region.

The joint commander must carefully consider the impact nuclear weapon use and the overall campaign design will have on other regional nuclear-capable powers. Some may threaten involvement (conventional or nuclear) if subjected to weapon effects; some may threaten involvement if their territory is directly attacked, some may see the conflict as justification for completing nuclear weapons programs, and others may ally themselves with the regional adversary (especially if the U.S. uses nuclear weapons). Most will express alarm at the possibility of nuclear use near their territory, particularly since nuclear weapon effects can impact allies and potential adversaries well beyond the theater of operations (fallout and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) are two examples of such wide-area effects).

DEVELOPING AND SELECTING COURSES OF ACTION (COAs)

Regardless of whether the mission is to intervene in a conventional regional conflict where the possibility of nuclear use exists (e.g., Desert Shield/Storm against a nuclear armed Iraq), or to undertake operations designed to eliminate a regional nuclear threat (e.g., preemptive attack against an adversary's nuclear capability), COA development and selection will be difficult. Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1 provides insight on this issue:

“Because the use of nuclear weapons...would be so influential, there is a temptation to make one of two tacit assumptions during planning: nuclear weapons will not be used at all or nuclear weapons can be quickly employed by friendly forces if the need

arises. Either assumption can be dangerous. The joint planner must work with a realistic appreciation of both the possibility of the employment of nuclear weapons and the CINC's lack of effective control over the decision for their initial use."¹⁵

Risk Management. Nuclear weapons will present the commander with a quantum increase in risk. Since "ends, ways, means, and risks are all closely interrelated, a great increase in risk wrought by the introduction of nuclear weapons into the equation requires a reassessment of ends, ways, and means."¹⁶ The commander (who addresses the "ends-ways-means-risk" balance during COA development and selection) may propose to either restrict or expand ways and means to accomplish his objectives with lowest risk. Such proposals must be carefully balanced against the risk analysis (perhaps resulting in different limitations) that will surely occur at higher levels of authority.

Intelligence Assessments. Accurate intelligence of adversary capability and intent is vital; however, the joint commander must carefully balance assessments of adversary intent against the grave consequences of error. "The massive penalty for incorrectly judging the adversary's intentions would require a worst case assumption even if intelligence information suggested the adversary would not employ nuclear weapons."¹⁷

COA Development. The joint commander can generally view regional nuclear planning in two broad cases: 1) Planned use by the U.S., and 2) Nuclear use possible by either side, but not intended.¹⁸ The second category (the most likely planning case) will necessitate creation of a basic conventional plan, with alternatives for a nuclear contingency.¹⁹

The possibility of nuclear use will impact COA development in many ways. Campaign objectives, design, and execution may all be altered (either limited or expanded) in an attempt to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons or to control escalation if use occurs. The joint commander should expect that political limitations will be a major part of the planning process.

Escalation control will be a key objective when hostilities commence. This objective may result in the imposition of restraints. For example, classes of targets like enemy leadership, command, control, communications systems, early warning systems, nuclear forces, nuclear production and storage facilities, airfields with nuclear-capable forces, and industrial facilities may be withheld based on the assessment of their escalation potential. On the other hand, some target classes may be included or expanded depending on the degree of escalation control the commander believes he has. Escalation control assessments are imprecise and, at best, are likely to be based on difficult assumptions.

Some of the most vexing issues will surround the question of whether a COA is intended for implementation before or after adversary nuclear use. Planners must structure COAs intended for implementation before adversary nuclear use to avoid triggering the very use they are intended to prevent; damage limitation and conventional vs. nuclear retaliation are the key concerns for COAs intended for implementation after adversary nuclear use.

The complex issue of U.S. nuclear employment will present the biggest challenge to the entire chain of command. Recognizing that the nuclear employment decision made by the NCA will be based on a myriad of strategic factors (many of which lie beyond the scope of the immediate military situation), the joint commander should address this issue from the

standpoint of whether or not conventional weapons are adequate to achieve the military objectives, and whether or not they are adequate to limit damage and prevent further use if the adversary employs nuclear weapons. Because many other factors will influence the ultimate NCA nuclear employment decision, the commander should be prepared for a range of possibilities: employment denied; employment approved; employment directed regardless of request.

The joint commander must ensure all issues pertinent to the specifics of the particular scenario are thoroughly considered during COA development and, as best as possible, agreement reached at all appropriate levels prior to campaign initiation.

Possible COAs. Open sources contain a number of possible COAs for dealing with a nuclear-armed adversary.²⁰ The most plausible COAs fall in the following general categories:²¹

1. Deter the adversary from using nuclear weapons. Deterrence is the "first priority" in a regional contingency involving a nuclear adversary (and an objective that will continue throughout the conflict).²² Various deterrence options are available: forward-basing/forward-deploying nuclear forces (bombers, dual-capable aircraft, attack submarines); increasing strategic nuclear force readiness; increasing the frequency of reconnaissance over enemy nuclear facilities; ensuring the presence of conventional forces capable of attacking assets the enemy values most; and deploying defensive capabilities could all be done in conjunction with strong political statements regarding the consequences of enemy nuclear use.²³ The purpose of taking such steps is to signal U.S. capability and resolve. However, deterrence credibility is a major question that the joint

commander must address; regional nuclear deterrence may not be the same as Cold War deterrence. As was true during the Cold War, deterrent signals must still be "sent, received, understood, and considered to be of sufficient magnitude by the challenger to be effective."²⁴ Some presently argue that the U.S. has advantages that contribute to ensuring deterrence credibility in a regional context (i.e., U.S. need not threaten to use nuclear weapons first as it did in the Cold War; U.S. resolve may be very strong in regions where vital national interests are at stake; U.S. has tremendous conventional and nuclear advantages).²⁵ Others say that signaling may be "particularly difficult across cultural lines or between adversaries who lack a shared frame of reference."²⁶ Ultimately, deterrent effectiveness is directly related to the characteristics of the adversary and specifics of the scenario (i.e., nature of the crisis, motivations of the adversary, adversary's resolve, and relative military balance).²⁷ ²⁸ A combination of nuclear and conventional offensive forces and defensive forces and actions may be the most credible package to deter the adversary throughout the conflict.

2. Destroy adversary nuclear weapons before they are launched. This is an extremely high risk COA; but it has high payoff if successful. Probability of success will vary depending on the size, sophistication, and deployment of the adversary's nuclear threat. As evidenced by the low success rate of coalition air forces against Iraqi Scuds in 1991, preemption may not completely eliminate adversary capability.²⁹ International inspection teams in Iraq following the Gulf War announced that most of Iraq's nuclear facilities had neither been discovered nor targeted, and the success of both the Scud hunt and Patriot defenses are still being debated.³⁰ Nuclear-capable adversaries will surely view the

results of Desert Storm as proof of the need to carefully hide and disperse their arsenals. Not only may the friendly force be unable to achieve complete elimination of enemy nuclear capability, but lack of success could trigger nuclear use or increase the threat against other friendly countries as the adversary faces a "use or lose" decision. The commander may decide it is most prudent to avoid placing the adversary in that position.

3. Protect U.S. forces and other targets. Defenses would enhance deterrence by creating uncertainty in the mind of the adversary regarding the success of nuclear use. Active (e.g., theater early warning, ballistic missile defenses, air defenses) and passive defensive measures (e.g., EMP hardening, shelters, dispersal, civil defense) are equal components of this COA. Active defenses are potentially the most effective; however, active defenses will never be perfect and, without a nuclear offensive complement, may not be seen by the aggressor as sufficiently threatening to deter nuclear use. Similarly, active air and missile defenses may not be suited to prevent the unconventional delivery of a few weapons, or to prevent the detonation of "stay behind" weapons left in areas overrun by a friendly advance.³¹ The joint commander must carefully consider the entire range of plausible adversary capabilities, and the likely deterrence impact defenses combined with conventional-only offensive capability will have on the adversary when considering this COA.
4. Defeat the adversary's military conventionally. This COA would basically follow the Desert Storm model by conducting high-intensity conventional warfare against the full range of adversary military capabilities. Pursuing this COA before adversary nuclear use is subject to the concern of triggering such use. Target selection would be particularly

critical in this COA, as the joint commander either seeks to clearly signal his intent to avoid eliminating adversary nuclear capability, or as he attempts to preempt that capability with high confidence. If the adversary employs nuclear weapons in the face of conventional attack, the joint commander will be faced with a situation of assessing the target(s) and effectiveness of the adversary's nuclear strike and recommending whether or not to continue this COA.

5. Limit further damage after adversary use. Targeting and the nature of the retaliatory response are the key issues in this COA. Damage limitation efforts may be undertaken with either conventional or nuclear weapons against any/all aspects of the adversary's nuclear capability (forces, C3, leadership), coupled with active and passive defenses. High-confidence damage limitation may be difficult to achieve for the same reason that preemption is difficult to achieve (i.e., finding and attacking the right targets).
6. Punish the adversary. After adversary nuclear use this COA would attack some or all of the adversary's infrastructure, leadership, and urban-industrial centers to punish him for that act. Conventional, or a combination of conventional and nuclear weapons could be used.

Post-war Considerations. The joint commander would have to address two primary issues when contemplating the post-war phase of the conflict: 1) termination difficulties; and 2) mitigating nuclear effects.

Joint doctrine addresses the potential difficulties of terminating a nuclear conflict: "Depending on the scope and intensity of a nuclear war, how and under what conditions it is brought to conclusion may be very different from previous wars."³² Because there is no

historical precedent on which to base nuclear conflict termination, and because it would be impossible to return to the *status quo ante* following nuclear use, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding this issue.

As with every other aspect of a nuclear contingency, it is highly likely that military considerations will not dominate the termination phase. If nuclear use has not occurred, termination may occur before the adversary's nuclear capabilities are damaged or destroyed. If nuclear use has occurred, world opinion may force termination before the joint commander's military objectives are achieved. It is also possible that, depending on the result of an enemy strike, the passions unleashed as a result of nuclear use will create momentum to completely defeat the adversary. The joint commander must clearly understand the political end condition prior to starting in the campaign, and must coordinate closely with his superiors during the campaign to participate in the debate that will certainly occur on this issue.

Mitigating the effects of a regional nuclear conflict will be very difficult. The joint commander need only recall the clean-up activities required in Kuwait following the Gulf War to begin to see the concerns that must be addressed if nuclear weapons are employed (e.g., mass casualties, environmental and ecological damage, etc.).

IMPACT ON WAR FIGHTING DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONS

The possibility of nuclear employment in a regional conflict will impact "deployment, the scheme of maneuver, the tasks assigned to subordinate commanders, the logistics support concept, command, control, and communications arrangements--in short, the entire concept

of operations.”³³ Although many of these impacts are intuitively obvious, and joint doctrine broadly addresses most of these issues, there is little if any detailed discussion about precisely how each of the above areas is impacted and, most importantly, what the synergistic affect is on the overall conduct of the campaign. The key question is: Will the possibility of nuclear use substantially affect the way in which the U.S. is preparing to conduct regional contingencies (planning, training, force structure, doctrine) and, if so, how?

Strategic Deployment and Logistics. “Overseas projection capability is a critical element of (U.S.) post-Cold War military strategy.”³⁴ Today’s concept of operations for a regional contingency is based on the premise that U.S. forces will deploy to a theater using amphibious ships, prepositioned ships, and massive airlift, and establish an assured logistics flow once there. U.S. forces rely heavily on massive external logistics support, and this is even more true in an era of reduced forward basing. Coincidentally, major logistics concentrations will present lucrative targets for nuclear attack; therefore, the joint commander must consider how his forces will operate if logistics support is constrained due to dispersal, if forces and supplies arrive piecemeal into widely separated dispersal bases, or if forces close far more slowly than currently planned in order to deny the adversary the most tempting concentrated targets.

Force Dispersal and Posture. Force dispersal is essential in a possible nuclear environment, yet force dispersal can weaken force capability and employment flexibility. Operating in a nuclear environment could possibly negate U.S. force projection advantages if key assets (e.g., tactical air power, aircraft carriers, amphibious ships) must remain out of

adversary nuclear range. Similarly, the joint commander may find it difficult to concentrate forces as early as necessary to successfully halt the adversary's advance (such as an invasion of Kuwait or South Korea), and a Desert Storm-style concentration may be particularly difficult to achieve. Both force projection and concentration of force impacts have deterrence implications.

Posturing theater nuclear forces is an additional area of concern. Given the fact that strategic bombers are no longer on nuclear alert, and that theater nuclear weapons only remain forward-deployed with dual-capable aircraft in Europe, returning nuclear weapons to forward forces entering a regional contingency may prove problematic.³⁵ Once loaded, some assets may have to remain postured for the nuclear strike mission throughout the contingency; therefore, some dual-capable aircraft, strategic bombers, tankers, and attack submarines may not be available for conventional missions, adding to the burden on other U.S. forces at the same time the overall pool of available forces is declining (and coalition partners may be few).

Active and Passive Defense. Depending on the nature of the threat, the joint commander may need to dedicate substantial assets to active defense. Early in a conflict this could impact the commander's flexibility to employ those assets where they are most needed to influence conventional operations (examples might be Air Force and Naval Aviation assets that need to be devoted to air/fleet defense vice offensive missions). Active defense assets may need to remain committed to friendly nation defense to satisfy coalition concerns as well. Passive defensive measures will also "inhibit the effectiveness of offensive forces by

reducing flexibility, increasing weight, and requiring specialized training.³⁶ Overall operational tempo can also be affected as a result of defensive measures.

CONCLUSIONS

Since the U.S. military is tasked to be prepared to deal with a nuclear-armed regional adversary, joint commanders must carefully consider the implications of such an eventuality on campaign planning and operations. The possibility of nuclear use in a regional contingency will complicate initial planning, impact COA selection, and inhibit war fighting operations in expected and unexpected ways. Although the operational-level implications reviewed in this paper are not new to U.S. commanders (virtually all are present to some degree in every contingency), the tremendous military and political consequences of nuclear use magnify their importance and may create a synergistic impact on the campaign that is far greater than currently anticipated. The U.S. military successfully confronted a nuclear adversary during the Cold War; yet the strategic and operational planning precepts which guided that confrontation evolved over many years. Despite much academic attention regarding the strategic aspects of this problem (e.g., proliferation, deterrence, political strategies, etc.) little detailed attention has yet been paid to the impact of the regional nuclear threat at the campaign level. While none of the problems caused by the possibility of nuclear use appear insurmountable, only through detailed planning and exercising will joint commanders comprehensively address and fully understand regional nuclear contingencies. Now is the time to proceed; Presidential tasking and deterrence credibility demand it.

End Notes

¹ The author is not suggesting that residual Cold War nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union pose no threat to U.S. security. Certainly the U.S. must closely monitor remaining Cold War nuclear forces and maintain a strong (although smaller) strategic deterrent force for the foreseeable future.

² See U.S. President, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1995, p. 13-14, and, Les Aspin, "The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative Created," *Defense News*, Vol. 8, No. 68, December 7, 1993, pp. 1-3. Similarly, at this writing the United States is pressing for extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which expires in 1995.

³ In 1993 the Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus categorized potential Third World proliferators as follows: De Facto Nuclear Weapons States (i.e., have weapons covertly--India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa); Threshold Nuclear Weapons States (i.e., on the verge of acquiring--North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Brazil, Argentina); and Other Countries of Concern (i.e., Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Korea). According to the Caucus, North Korea and Iran are aggressively pursuing nuclear capability. Iraq's interest in nuclear weapons is well documented in many sources. Other so-called "Threshold" states like Brazil and Argentina have rolled back their programs, and South Africa has publicly claimed that it has dismantled its weapons. See Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, *The Neglected Arms Race: Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s*, April 1993, pp. 8-11, and Jerome H. Kahan, *Nuclear Threats From Small States*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 13, 1994), pp. 2-3.

⁴ U.S. President, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1995, p. 14.

⁵ Years of Cold War nuclear planning (which emphasized nuclear weapons in a strategic vice operational setting) may not directly equate to the regional contingency environment. Key differences exist in the strategic environment, and in the nature (including motivations) and capability of the adversary. In 1994, the Secretary of Defense stated that nuclear-capable regional states may have different "doctrines, histories, organizations, command and control systems, and purposes for their unconventional military forces" than the Soviets. See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington: 1994), pp. 35; also see Michele A. Flournoy, "Implications for U.S. Military Strategy," in Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds., *New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. 140-141.

⁶ Joint Pub 3-12, *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations*, 29 April 1993, p. II-1.

⁷ Even though the decision process was "tortuous and was sometimes filled with emotional strain and debate," General Schwarzkopf has described General Powell as virtually his "sole point of contact within the Administration" during the Gulf War. See H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, The Autobiography, It Doesn't Take A Hero*, (New York: Bantam Books, 1992.), pp. xi and 325. Additionally, the author has personally read about or heard accounts of the decision process from many of the senior military officers involved in the Gulf War: most praised the fact that the politicians gave broad guidance and allowed the military to take care of the military details.

⁸ Kahan, p. 12.

⁹ Joint Pub 3-12, p. II-1.

¹⁰ Flournoy, p. 156.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 155.

¹² Joint Pub 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense*, p. III-11.

¹³ Ibid., p. III-11.

¹⁴ Thomas G. Mahnken, "America's Next War," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 3, (Summer 1993), p. 177.

¹⁵ Armed Forces Staff College, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993*, AFSC Pub 1, p. 6-52.

¹⁶ Memo from Professor Roger W. Barnett, Senior Secretary of the Navy Research Fellow, United States Naval War College, to Colonel C. Robert Kehler, 4 May 1995.

¹⁷ Ian B. Bryan, "U.S. Policy and Doctrine Regarding Nuclear Force in Regional Contingencies: Tactical Expediency Could Threaten Strategic Aims," Technical Report, Alexandria, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, p. 43.

¹⁸ AFSC Pub 1, pp. 6-52-53. U.S. Strategic Command plays a key supporting and coordinating role in regional nuclear planning.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 6-53.

²⁰ See Flournoy, pp. 140-157; Kahan, pp. 13-18; Kenneth Watman, and Dean Wilkening, *Nuclear Deterrence in a regional Conflict*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995, pp. 53-62; and Philip Zelikow, "Offensive Military Options," in Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds., *New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. 162-195.

²¹ COAs in this section are broadly based on the military options contained in: Kahan, pp. 13-18.

²² Joint Pub 3-12, p. I-3.

²³ Kahan, p. 14.

²⁴ Kenneth Watman, and Dean Wilkening, *Nuclear Deterrence in a regional Conflict*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995, p. 12.

²⁵ Ibid., p. x.

²⁶ Flournoy, p. 144.

²⁷ Watman and Wilkening, p. 8.

²⁸ Flournoy, pp. 145-146.

²⁹ Bryan, p. 41.

³⁰ See Martin van Creveld, *Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict*, New York: The Free Press, 1993, p. 117; and Lewis A. Dunn, "New Nuclear Threats to U.S. Security," in Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds., *New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, p. 23.

³¹ See Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, "Introduction: Understanding the Problem," in Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds., *New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. 3-19, for a thought-provoking scenario of "stay behind" weapons.

³² Joint Pub 3-12, p. I-6.

³³ AFSC Pub 1, pp. 6-52-53.

³⁴ Gary H. Mears and Ted Kim, "Logistics: The Way Ahead," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1994, p. 40.

³⁵ Problems may range from getting a decision to upload nuclear weapons (timing may be a crucial signaling issue), to reestablishing the logistics, security, and handling support network.

³⁶ Kahan, pp. 18-19.

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